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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 8, 2015, the Fourth Circuit decided the case of United States
ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc., reversing a district court's dismissal of a
civil False Claims Act ("FCA") suit alleging that a military contractor had
falsified marksmanship scores for Ugandan security guards hired to protect
Al Asad Airbase in Iraq.' Noting that the contract (or "Task Order") did not
expressly condition payment on satisfactory marksmanship scores, the
district court concluded that Triple Canopy's claims for payment did not
"represent an objective falsehood" and therefore did not contain any
factually false statements.2 On appeal the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding
the allegations cognizable under the FCA theory of "implied certification,"
in which the submission of a claim for government reimbursement "implies"
Dan K. Moore Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School
of Law; Professor of Social Medicine (Secondary Appointment), University of North Carolina
School of Medicine; Adjunct Professor, Health Policy & Management, Gillings School of
Global Public Health. I am grateful for the research assistance provided by Ariana Johnson.
All errors are mine alone.
1. United States ex reL Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 775 F.3d 628 (4th Cir. 2015),
vacated and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 2504 (2016); see also 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2012)
(False Claims Act).
2. United States ex reL Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 2d 888, 896 (E.D.
Va. 2013), affirmed in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 775 F.3d 628 (4th Cir. 2015),
vacated and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 2504 (2016).
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that the person making the claim has satisfied all relevant rules.3 While the
Fourth Circuit was the first circuit to consider the validity of implied
certification in 2015, it would not be the last. By the end of the year, no
fewer than four federal appellate cases had considered the validity of the
4theory, setting the stage for Supreme Court review.
A strong argument could be made that Triple Canopy was the most
important of these cases, raising the specter of the federal government
relying on security guards who lacked the basic skills needed to use their
weapons. Yet the Fourth Circuit's rather dry analysis of "Theater-Wide
Internal Security Services Task Orders" lacked the emotional heft of United
States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Services, Inc., a First Circuit case
brought by the parents of a young woman, Yarushka Rivera, who died after
receiving Medicaid-covered mental health treatment from a Massachusetts
clinic. Her parents argued that the Medicaid claims submitted by the clinic
contained implied representations of compliance with the state licensing and
supervision rules for mental health services-representations that turned out
6to be false, thus rendering the claims fraudulent under the FCA. Adopting a
broad theory of implied certification, the First Circuit reversed the district
court's decision to dismiss the suit.7 Perhaps due to the tragic facts and
sympathetic plaintiffs, or perhaps in tacit recognition of the growing
numbers of FCA suits involving Medicare and Medicaid, the Supreme Court
chose Escobar ather than Triple Canopy as the vehicle to address implied
certification.'
3. 775 F.3d at 635-38. The district court had declined to recognize the implied
certification theory based on prior Fourth Circuit precedent. 950 F. Supp.2d at 899. For a full
discussion of the implied certification theory, see Joan H. Krause, Reflections on Certiication,
Interpretation, and the Quest for Fraud that "Counts" Under the False Claims Act, 2017 U.
ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
4. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Escobar, Inc. v. Universal Health Servs., 780 F.3d
504, 512 (1st Cir. 2015) (upholding implied certification if the violated provision was a
"material precondition of payment"), vacated and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016); United
States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 788 F.3d 696, 711-12 (7th Cir. 2015) (rejecting implied
certification entirely as applied to "the thousands of pages of federal statutes and regulations
incorporated by reference into certain participation agreements"), vacated and remanded,
United States ex rel. Nelson v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 136 S. Ct. 2506 (2016); United States ex
rel. Davis v. District of Columbia, 793 F.3d 120, 120-25 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (explicitly limiting
implied certification to compliance with clear conditions of payment), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
699 (2015).
5. Escobar, 780 F.3d at 504.
6. Id. at 510-11.
7. Id. at 512.
8. Since major amendments in 1986, the proportion of health care-related FCA suits
compared to defense-related FCA suits has grown exponentially: two-thirds of the qui tam
suits filed in 2013 raised allegations of fraud in the federal health care programs, compared to
846 [VOL. 68: 845
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In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court
upheld the implied certification theory: in situations in which a defendant
"makes specific representations about the goods or services provided, but
knowingly fails to disclose . . . noncompliance with a statutory, regulatory,
or contractual requirement[,] . . . liability may attach if the omission renders
those representations misleading."9 Cautioning that such misrepresentations
must meet a "demanding" standard of being "material to the Government's
payment decision," the Court nevertheless reversed and remanded the suit
because the First Circuit had applied an impermissibly broad test. o Soon
after, the Justices remanded Triple Canopy and a Seventh Circuit implied
certification case for further proceedings."
At first blush, the differences between the Escobar opinion and the
Fourth Circuit Triple Canopy opinion are subtle. Both courts recognized the
validity of implied certification as an actionable theory of falsity under the
FCA, and both found the theory applicable to significant misrepresentations
that may affect the government's payment decision. Where the Fourth
Circuit faltered was in crafting a test for that latter determination: the types
of misrepresentations that will be considered "material" to the government's
payment decision. As it turned out, the Supreme Court appeared to adopt a
far more demanding standard of materiality than many observers had
thought would be applicable under the FCA.
II. IMPLIED CERTIFICATION AND MATERIALITY UNDER THE FCA
Originally enacted during the Civil War, the FCA was designed to
prohibit such basic forms of fraud as substituting sand for gunpowder sold to
only ten percent in 1987. FALSE CLAIMS ACT STATISTICS, CIVIL DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE
(Dec. 23, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/sties/default/files/civil/legacy/2013/12/26/C-
FRAUDSFCA Statistics .pdf
9. Universal Health Sers., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1995
(2016).
10. Id at 1996.
11. See United States ex rel. Nelson v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 136 S. Ct. 2506 (2016);
United States ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 2504 (2016) (granting certiorari
and vacating judgments). The Justices also remanded an Eighth Circuit case construing a
similar theory of FCA fraudulent inducement. United States ex rel. Miller v. Weston Educ.,
Inc., 784 F.3d 1198 (8th Cir. 2015), vacated and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 2505 (2016). As of
March 2017, Triple Canopy remains pending on remand, while the appellate courts have
affirmed the original decisions in Escobar, Miller, and Sanford-Brown. United States ex rel.
Escobar v. Universal Health Serys., Inc., 842 F.3d 103, 111-12 (1st Cir. 2016); United States
v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 840 F.3d 445, 448 (7th Cir. 2016); United States ex rel. Miller v.
Weston Educ., Inc., 840 F.3d 494, 508 (8th Cir. 2016).
2017] 847
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Union troops.12 In the intervening years, the statute has evolved into a
powerful civil weapon against fraud in the federal health care programs. The
two major provisions of the Act are (a) the basic false claims prohibition in
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A), which applies when someone "knowingly
presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment
or approval"; and (b) the false records and statements prohibition in
§ 3729(a)(1)(B), which applies when someone "knowingly makes, uses, or
causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or
fraudulent claim."13 Under the FCA, "knowingly" includes not simply actual
knowledge of falsity, but also deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard.'4
As of August 2016, FCA violations are subject to civil penalties of $10,781
to $21,563 per claim, plus three times the government's damages.'5
The broad reach of the FCA is due in part to the law's qui tam
provision, which permits a private "relator" to sue on the government's
behalf and share a portion of the proceeds-fifteen to twenty-five percent if
the government decides to intervene, twenty-five to thirty percent if not.
The qui tam mechanism ensures that FCA cases can be filed by a wide range
of individuals and entities beyond federal prosecutors, including current or
former employees such as Omar Badr (a former Triple Canopy medic), or
patients and their representatives, such as Yarushka Rivera's parents.
Historically, most health care FCA allegations have involved "factually
false" representations, most obviously claims for medical services that were
not provided to patients. 17 More recently the statute has been invoked
against "legally false" claims, where the item or service may have been
provided to patients but the defendant also violated some underlying federal
12. See, e.g., 144 Cong. Rec. 14,744 (1998) (stating that President Lincoln became
"frustrated by the widespread fraud against the Union Army by defense contractors during the
Civil War"); Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fise: Paradigms of
Government Harm Under the Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REV. 121, 128-29 (2001)
(noting that the FCA was not enacted to "address the problem of health care fraud[,]" but
rather to address the "day-to-day effects of fraud on the Union Army during the Civil War").
13. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) & (B) (2012). Other provisions in the FCA that may be
relevant to health care fraud include prohibitions on conspiracies to submit false claims and so-
called "reverse" false claims that understate an obligation to (re)pay the federal government.
Id. at § 3729(a)(1)(A)-(C).
14. Id. § 3729(b)(1).
15. Id. § 3729(a)(1); 28 C.F.R. § 85.5 (2016).
16. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2012).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Krizek, 859 F. Supp. 5, 7 (D.D.C. 1994) (alleging that a
psychiatrist billed for more extensive-and expensive-types of therapy than he provided).
848 [VOL. 68: 845
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rule, such as a Medicare participation requirement. To complicate matters
further, courts have recognized two distinct theories of legal falsity. Under
"express certification," a claim is considered to be false because the
defendant explicitly and "falsely certifies compliance with a particular
statute, regulation or contractual term, where compliance is a prerequisite to
payment."19 In contrast, the theory of "implied certification" holds that the
simple "act of submitting a claim for reimbursement itself implies
compliance with governing federal rules," even in the absence of any
20explicit misrepresentation. Implied certification extends FCA liability from
straightforward false statements of compliance to potentially any failure to
comply with the larger universe of federal program rules, even if they are
not explicitly reflected in any compliance statement.
Triple Canopy arose because the federal circuits have adopted different
rules to determine when a violation of one of the many conditions imposed
on government program participants will be encompassed by implied
certification. Prior to the most recent spate of cases, two broad approaches
had emerged. Recognizing that government programs such as Medicare and
Medicaid impose thousands of conditions on participants, ranging from the
major to the mundane, the Second Circuit in United States ex rel. Mikes v.
Straus adopted a widely-cited rule limiting implied certification to violations
of requirements that are clear prerequisites to government payment-rather
than, for example, violations of less serious "conditions of participation" that
21
may be resolved through administrative remedies short of refusal to pay.
As the Second Circuit explained, this theory imposes liability where "a
defendant submits a claim for reimbursement while knowing . . . that
payment expressly is precluded because of some noncompliance by the
defendant."22 Before Escobar ultimately rejected the proposition, Mikes also
required that the payment precondition be spelled out explicitly in the
underlying law or regulations.2 3
18. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg'l Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d
1211, 1215-17 (10th Cir. 2008) (alleging that a hospital submitted bills in violation of
Medicare participation requirements and the Medicare & Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute).
19. United States ex rel. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 698 (2d Cir. 2001), abrogated
by Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016).
20. Id. at 699 (citing Lisa Michelle Phelps, Calling off the Bounty Hunters: Discrediting
the Use of alleged Anti-Kickback Violations to Support Civil False Claims Actions, 51 VAND.
L. REv. 1003, 1015 (1998)).
21. Id
22. Id. at 700.
23. See id. (citing United States ex rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 214
F.3d 1372, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("[I]mplied false certification is appropriately applied only
when the underlying statute or regulation upon which the plaintiff relies expressly states the
2017] 849
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At the other end of the spectrum, the First Circuit in Escobar took a
broad view of implied certification, asking "simply whether the defendant,
in submitting a claim for reimbursement, knowingly misrepresented
compliance with a material precondition of payment"-a condition that
"need not be 'expressly designated"' but must be determined by "a close
reading of the foundational documents, or statutes and regulations, at
issue."24 Rather than looking solely to the text of the law and rules to
determine whether the defendant violated an explicit payment condition, the
First Circuit's approach requires a review of all potentially applicable
provisions to determine whether any of them, implicitly, are relevant to the
payment decision. In short, the First Circuit's "materiality" approach looks
to the potential for the violation to affect the payment decision, even in the
absence of any law or regulation specifying that relationship.
While materiality is not a new concept under the FCA,25 defining
implied certification by reference to materiality is nonetheless curious. The
original statute contained no explicit materiality requirement, although
numerous circuits ruled that "[1]iability under each of the provisions of the
False Claims Act is subject to the further, judicially-imposed, requirement
that the false statement or claim be material."26 Most courts, however, have
addressed materiality as a general element of FCA liability, not as a method
of proving falsity or fraud specifically through the theory of implied
certification. Indeed, Mikes made clear that the implied certification analysis
was "distinct from a requirement imposed by some courts that a false
statement or claim must be material to the government's funding decision."27
The situation was complicated by the passage of the Fraud Enforcement
and Recovery Act of 2009 ("FERA"),28 which added materiality as an
explicit element of the FCA false records and statements prohibition in
§ 3729(a)(1)(B).29 FERA defined materiality as "having a natural tendency
provider must comply in order to be paid."). But see Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2001-02 (rejecting
limitation).
24. United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Serys., Inc., 780 F.3d 504, 512-13
(1st Cir. 2015) (emphasis added) (citing New York v. Amgen Inc., 652 F.3d 103, 110 (1st Cir.
2011). See also United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med., Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 387-
88 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Sci. Applications Int'l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1268 (D.C.
Cir 2010)).
25. See John T. Boese, The Past, Present, and Future of "Materiality" Under the False
Claims Act, 3 ST. Louis U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 291, 295 (2010) (providing that "[t]he
history and development of materiality under the FCA is a fascinating case study in statutory
construction").
26. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 785 (4th Cir. 1999).
27. United States ex rel. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 697 (2d Cir. 2001).
28. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617.
29. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (2012); 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) (2012).
850 [VOL. 68: 845
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to influence, or be[ing] capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of
money or property."30 However, implied certification cases arise instead
under the basic false claims prohibition in § 3729(a)(1)(A), which Congress
did not amend. As a purely textual matter, then, it would appear that the
statute does not require materiality for a basic false claim, regardless of
whether that falsity is "legal" or "factual" in nature.
Moreover, different definitions of materiality emerged in the federal
courts. Some circuits "adopted a 'natural tendency test' for materiality,
which focuses on the potential effect of the false statement when it is made
rather than on the false statement's actual effect after it is discovered.... 31
As the Fifth Circuit explained:
Some courts have defined the standard to require "outcome
materiality"-"a falsehood or misrepresentation must affect the
government's ultimate decision whether to remit funds to the
claimant in order to be 'material."' . . . [while] []other court[s]
require[] what is termed "claim materiality"-"a falsehood or
misrepresentation must be material to the defendant's claim of right
in order to be considered 'material' for the purposes of the FCA." 32
The distinction essentially rested on whether a misrepresentation had to
have the actual ability to affect the government's payment decision or
merely the potential to do so. While FERA's "natural tendency" test did not
specifically address the debate, many courts nonetheless interpreted the
legislation as adopting the lower "claim materiality" threshold. As the Fifth
Circuit later explained, "[i]f Congress intended materiality to be defined
under the more narrow outcome materiality standard, it had ample
opportunity to adopt the outcome materiality standard in FERA."33
III. TRIPLE CANOPY AND THE ESCOBAR TEST
Whether materiality would be the defining characteristic of implied
certification-and, if so, whether cases arising under § 3729(a)(1)(A) would
be governed by the relatively low materiality threshold adopted by FERA-
remained unclear when the Fourth Circuit heard arguments in Triple Canopy
in October 2014. Faced with this unclear precedent, the court adopted a
30. Id. § 3729(b)(4) (2012).
31. United States v. Bourseau, 531 F.3d 1159, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008).
32. United States ex rel Longhi v. Lithium Power Tech., Inc., 575 F.3d 458, 468-69
(5th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Southland Mgmt., 288 F.3d. 665, 666 (5 th Cir. 2002)).
33. Id. at 470.
2017] 851
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standard for implied certification that would in large part be supported by
the subsequent Supreme Court opinion in Escobar. On the key issue of
materiality, however, the judges appeared to choose the wrong side of the
debate.
A. The Triple Canopy Analysis
The Fourth Circuit began by reiterating the elements of an action under
§ 3729(a)(1)(A): "(1) a false statement or fraudulent course of conduct; (2)
made with the requisite scienter; (3) that is material; and (4) that results in a
claim to the Government."34 Recognizing that the circuit had not previously
adopted implied certification, the court clearly held "that the Government
pleads a false claim when it alleges that the contractor, with the requisite
scienter, made a request for payment under a contract and 'withheld
information about its noncompliance with material contractual
requirements,"' even if those requirements were not expressly designated as
prerequisites to payment.35 The judges acknowledged the danger that
plaintiffs might seek to use implied certification to convert standard
breaches of contract into more lucrative FCA actions, but indicated the
danger could be minimized by strict adherence to the FCA scienter and
36materiality tests, as well as sanctions for abusive behavior.
Using that framework, the judges had little trouble concluding that the
government had sufficiently alleged a violation of the FCA. Not only did the
complaint identify multiple examples of Triple Canopy's failure to satisfy
the Task Order marksmanship requirements, it alleged that the company
undertook a detailed scheme with actual knowledge thereof to
fraudulently create records that would hide those deficiencies.37 The core of
the analysis turned on the issue of materiality, defined under FERA's
"natural tendency to influence, or ... capable of influencing" standard.38
Rather than applying that test in the abstract, the Fourth Circuit pointed out
that "common sense strongly suggests that the Government's decision to pay
a contractor for providing base security in an active combat zone would be
influenced by knowledge that the guards could not, for lack of a better term,
34. United States ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 775 F.3d 628, 634 (4th Cir. 2015).
35. Id. at 636. Based on Fourth Circuit precedent, the district court had earlier
concluded that the Fourth Circuit did not recognize implied certification. United States ex rel.
Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 2d 888, 899-900 (E.D. Va. 2013).
36. Triple Canopy, 775 F.3d at 637.
37. See id. (the court "readily conclude[d] that the Government [had] sufficiently
alleged a false claim").
38. Id.
852 [VOL. 68: 845
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shoot straight."39 Moreover, the actions taken to cover up the deficiencies
strongly suggested that Triple Canopy believed marksmanship proficiency
was in fact material to the government.40
The court reserved its most pointed pronouncement on materiality,
however, for its separate discussion of whether the government had stated a
claim under the FCA false records and statements provision in
§ 3729(a)(1)(B), an allegation the district court dismissed due to lack of
evidence that the government had ever reviewed the false documents.4' In so
doing, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court had misperceived the
core of materiality:
In other words, the FCA reaches government contractors who
employ false records that are capable of influencing a decision, not
simply those who create records that actually do influence the
decision ... The district court thus erred in focusing on the actual
effect of the false statement rather than its potential effect. A false
record may, in the appropriate circumstances, have the potential to
influence the Government's payment decision even if the
42Government ultimately does not review the record.
The holding strongly resembles the "claim materiality" standard,
although the Fourth Circuit did not reference the debate. Because the
falsified marksmanship scorecards would help establish that the invoices
satisfied the Task Order criteria in the event the government chose to review
the personnel files, the court found those records to be integral-and thus
material-to the scheme.43
The applicability of this broad analysis remained unclear, however. The
detailed discussion of materiality as encompassing potential vs. actual
effects occurred during the court's review of the § 3729(a)(1)(B) false
records allegations rather than the implied certification allegations brought
under § 3729(a)(1)(A). As noted above, FERA applied the "natural
tendency" materiality test to false records and statements under (a)(1)(B),
but not to (a)(1)(A) false claims. A narrow reading of the Fourth Circuit's
39. Id at 637-38.
40. Id at 638 (questioning why else Triple Canopy would have attempted to hide the
problems).
41. Id at 638-39.
42. Id at 639.
43. Id at 639-40. Despite reversing the district court on these counts, the Fourth Circuit
upheld the dismissal of additional claims brought by the relator involving sites other than Al
Asad. Id. at 640.
2017] 853
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decision might suggest that the court's pronouncements on materiality are
thus inapplicable to implied certification cases arising under the (a)(1)(A)
false claims provision. While not explicitly acknowledging that debate,
however, the judges clearly applied the FERA definition of materiality to the
implied certification allegations, indicating that they believed the FERA
"natural tendency" test governed both FCA sections at issue.44
B. Escobar Redraws the Boundaries
Rather than the relatively straightforward analysis adopted in Triple
Canopy, the Supreme Court instead chose to review the more emotionally
compelling (albeit jurisprudentially confounding) Escobar decision.45 In
Escobar, the First Circuit allowed Yarushka Rivera's parents to proceed
with their FCA allegations under the theory that the clinic had falsely
implied that it was in compliance with Massachusetts mental health
licensure and supervision requirements in order to obtain payment from the
46MassHealth (Medicaid) program. Finding none of those requirements to be
explicit preconditions of payment, the district court held that they were not
actionable under the FCA and granted the clinic's motion to dismiss.47 The
First Circuit reversed, taking a broad view that "eschewed [the] distinctions
between factually and legally false claims, and those between implied and
express certification .... 48 Instead, the court asked "simply whether the
defendant, in submitting a claim for reimbursement, knowingly
misrepresented compliance with a material precondition of payment."49
Similar to the Fourth Circuit, the First Circuit held that the link to payment
"need not be 'expressly designated,"' but must be determined by "a close
reading of the foundational documents, or statutes and regulations, at
issue."50 Upon that "close reading" the First Circuit found that the
regulations at issue were in fact conditions of MassHealth payment.
44. Id. at 637-38.
45. Universal Health Sers., Inc. v. United States ex rel Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989
(2016).
46. United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Sers., Inc., 780 F.3d 504, 517
(1st Cir. 2015).
47. United States ex reL Escobar v. Universal Health Sers., Inc., No. 11-11 170-DPW,
2014 WL 1271757, at *9 (D. Mass. Mar. 26, 2014).
48. Escobar, 780 F.3d at 512.
49. Id. at 512 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 512-13 (citing United States ex rel. Hutchinson v. Blackstone Med., Inc., 647
F.3d 377, 387-88 (1st Cir. 2011)).
51. Id. at 513.
854 [VOL. 68: 845
10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 4 [], Art. 13
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol68/iss4/13
WHITE COLLAR CRIME
On appeal, the clinic argued that the Supreme Court should decline to
recognize the theory of implied certification based on the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 551, under which a failure to disclose noncompliance is
not fraudulent in the absence of an affirmative duty to disclose.52 As a
fallback, the clinic argued that implied certification should be limited to
violations of expressly designated conditions of payment, similar to Mikes.53
The relators, supported by the United States as amicus curiae, responded
that a defendant who knowingly bills the government for services without
disclosing the failure to satisfy material conditions for the delivery of those
services has submitted a false claim, and argued instead that Restatement
§ 529 applies to a party that knows its failure to disclose additional
* * * * 54information will render its statements materially misleading.
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court declined to abolish implied
certification, holding that omissions may give rise to liability "when the
defendant submits a claim for payment that makes specific representations
about the goods or services provided, but knowingly fails to
disclose . . . noncompliance with a statutory, regulatory, or contractual
requirement."5 5 As did the Fourth Circuit, the Justices had little trouble
rejecting the attempt to limit the theory to expressly designated conditions of
payment. The Court noted that such a limitation would be both over and
underinclusive: the rule could allow defendants to escape liability for
violations that, while not risking non-payment, might have prevented their
participation in Medicare and Medicaid in the first place, while
simultaneously raising the potential for nearly unlimited liability if the
government conditioned payment on compliance with each and every
56regulation.
Also similar to the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court definitively held
that a misrepresentation must be material to the government's payment
decision in order to be actionable under the FCA. Rather than adopting the
government's view that any violation is material as "long as the defendant
knows that the Government would be entitled to refuse payment were it
aware of the violation"-a view similar to the "potential to influence"
standard adopted in Triple Canopy the Justices instead characterized the
52. Universal Health Sers Inc., v. United States ex rel Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2000
(2016).
53. Id at 2001; United States ex rel. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 700 (2d Cir. 2001).
54. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1999-2000.
55. Id at 1995.
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materiality standard as "demanding." Yet instead of applying the FERA
definition to false claims under § 3729(a)(1)(A), as the Fourth Circuit
appeared to do, the Justices merely noted that the FERA test was similar to
those derived from the common law. At oral argument, the Justices explored
at length whether the FCA should be interpreted through the lens of common
law tort definitions of fraud or the traditional contract law distinction
between material and non-material contract terms.59 Declining to set a
bright-line rule, the Escobar opinion simply noted that the tort and contract
definitions were "substantially similar," and equivalent to the FERA
language: "[U]nder any understanding of the concept, materiality 'look[s] to
the effect on the likely or actual behavior of the recipient of the alleged
misrepresentation."'6 0
While perhaps an accurate reflection of materiality in a literal,
descriptive sense, these statements raise a number of questions. As
interpreted under the FCA, the various definitions of materiality have most
assuredly not been interpreted as equivalent, nor as particularly
"demanding." Far from being viewed as a high bar, FERA's "natural
tendency to influence" language has been interpreted as signifying a
relatively low threshold for implied certification cases.61 The Court's
approach harkens back to the short-lived debate over claim and outcome
materiality, a debate resolved by the widespread assumption that FERA had
62adopted the lower "claim materiality" threshold. Without acknowledging
that history let alone the implications of contradicting longstanding
assumptions about FERA-the Court instead adopted a standard that
strongly resembled the more stringent "outcome materiality" approach.
C. Reassessing Triple Canopy in Light ofEscobar
In retrospect, Triple Canopy got many things right. The Fourth Circuit
accurately predicted the Supreme Court would uphold the implied
certification theory and would not restrict application of that theory to
58. Id. at 2003.
59. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9-10, 19-20, 35-37, 49, Universal Health Servs.
Inc. v. United States ex reL Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016) (No. 15-7).
60. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002 (citations omitted).
61. See supra notes 28-31.
62. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Longhi v. Lithium Power Tech., Inc., 575 F.3d 458,
470 (5th Cir. 2009) (explaining that Congress rejected "the more narrow outcome materiality
standard").
856 [VOL. 68: 845
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violations of expressly designated conditions of payment.63 The Fourth
Circuit was correct both in concluding that materiality is an integral
component of implied certification, and in acknowledging the danger that a
broad certification theory could be used to bring relatively minor contractual
disputes within the ambit of the FCA. As the Supreme Court would do the
following year, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a strict insistence on
materiality and scienter would be the best way of "continuing to ensure that
plaintiffs cannot shoehorn a breach of contract claim into an FCA
claim . ... 64
Where the Fourth Circuit erred was less regarding the concept of FCA
materiality and more regarding the specific materiality standard. The court
made two key errors, one statutory and one definitional. First, without even
mentioning that the FERA amendment did not, by its terms, apply to
§ 3729(a)(1)(A), Triple Canopy assumed that the definition of materiality in
§ 3729(b)(4) was also applicable to basic false claims allegations brought
65under a theory of implied certification. While Escobar did not reject that
proposition outright, the Justices explicitly refused to decide whether
§ 3729(a)(1)(A) materiality was governed by FERA or by common law
concepts.66
More importantly, the Fourth Circuit-albeit in the context of
construing false records allegations-defined materiality as encompassing
misrepresentations "that are capable of influencing a decision," focusing on
the potential effect of the misrepresentation rather than on its actual effect."
The Supreme Court, however, took pains to clarify that a "demanding"
standard of materiality requires more than a mere potential for harm, noting
that it is not "sufficient for a finding of materiality that the Government
would have the option to decline to pay if it knew of the defendant's
noncompliance."68 While not as broad as the First Circuit decision that gave
rise to Supreme Court review, the Fourth Circuit adopted a materiality
standard in Triple Canopy that would have made it significantly easier for
plaintiffs-government and relator alike-to prevail. As it turned out, that
bar was significantly lower than the Supreme Court appeared to apply.
63. United States ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 775 F.3d 628, 636 n.3, 637 n.5
(4th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Sci. Int'l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1268 (D.C. Cir.
2010)).
64. Id. at 637 (quoting SAIC, 626 F.3d at 1270). See also Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002
(describing how "other parts of the False Claims Act allay Universal Health's concerns").
65. Triple Canopy, 775 F.3d at 637 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) (2012)).
66. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002.
67. Triple Canopy, 775 F.3d at 639 (quoting United States ex rel. Harrison v.
Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 352 F.3d 908, 916-17 (4th Cir. 2003)).
68. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003.
2017] 857
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IV. CONCLUSION
Based on FCA precedent, the Fourth Circuit decision in Triple Canopy
was logical, even though it would in part be proven wrong. The judges were
correct in upholding implied certification as an actionable FCA theory,
applying it to violations of conditions not explicitly required for payment,
and concluding that materiality was a required element. Defining materiality
in terms of the potential effect of a misrepresentation on the decision-maker,
moreover, made sense in the context of the many circuits that had adopted
"claim materiality"-a standard that appeared to have been incorporated into
the statute through FERA. Given that history, it was the Supreme Court's
choice of a somewhat narrower test, not the decision in Triple Canopy, that
came as a surprise.
What effect is Escobar likely to have on remand in Triple Canopy? To
the extent the Fourth Circuit focused on the potential effect of the
marksmanship misrepresentations alone, rather than examining the
government's actual payment practices under the Task Order, it is possible
the allegations will not meet the higher threshold. Yet the Fourth Circuit's
detailed analysis of Triple Canopy's behavior makes it equally plausible, and
perhaps likely, that the allegations will be found to satisfy even the more
demanding Escobar standard. The court emphasized not only the "common
sense" conclusion that payment for armed guards likely depended on
whether those guards were capable of using their weapons, but also noted
that Triple Canopy must itself have believed the marksmanship requirement
was key to the payment decision; if not, the judges wondered, why would
the company "orchestrate a scheme to falsify records on multiple
occasions"?69 Evidence that the defendant recognized the importance of
hiding the deficiencies from the government suggests that the allegations
might well meet the Supreme Court's instruction that "materiality 'look[s] to
the effect on the likely or actual behavior of the recipient of the alleged
misrepresentation."'
70
Indeed, the bigger question may be what will happen if/when Triple
Canopy is remanded back to the district court. While allegations of material
misrepresentations satisfy the threshold for denying a motion to dismiss,
69. Triple Canopy, 775 F.3d at 637-38.
70. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002 (quoting 26 SAMUEL WILLISON & RICHARD A. LORD,
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 69:12 (4th ed. 2003)). Indeed, the result may be similar to that
in Escobar's remand to the First Circuit. See United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health
Servs., 842 F.3d 103, 110 (1st Cir. 2016) (explaining that the judges had "little difficulty in
concluding that Relators have sufficiently alleged that UHS's misrepresentations were
material" under the new standard).
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proving "Escobar materiality" at trial may be a more difficult undertaking.
The Supreme Court opinion suggests that standard may well require detailed
proof regarding the government's actual payment practices under this (and
perhaps similar) Task Orders, proof that would only be available after
extensive discovery. Coupled with the increased FCA penalties in effect as
of August 2016, defendants such as Triple Canopy may face enormous
pressure to settle-a result that may satisfy the short-term goals of the
parties to the litigation, but has the disadvantage of removing judicial
oversight of the development of the FCA in the long run. As with so many
aspects of the FCA post-Escobar, however, only time will tell how much of
the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Triple Canopy survives.
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